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Abstract
Highlights
• Defines the two types of social dilemmas; resource and public goods
• Describes the “cooperative mechanisms” of group identity, reciprocity and equity norms, and trust and trustworthiness, 
all critical for determining cooperation
• Reviews in detail the functions performed by an additional “cooperative mechanism,” communication, in terms both of 
the sheer opportunity to interact and the content of what is discussed
• Depicts the impact of two other variables, most notably group size and social value orientation, on the cooperative 
mechanisms
• Includes a model and set of propositions describing the relationships among relevant variables
• Explores some areas for further research and eventual inclusion into the model
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Introduction
The goal of this essay is to describe the process by which 
people facing group social dilemmas and provided with the 
opportunity to directly communicate with one another come 
to cooperate for the collective good. In group social dilem-
mas, participants have to choose between acquiring a short-
term benefit for themselves and helping to provide a long-term 
benefit for the aggregate as a whole. As such, group social 
dilemmas are an example of “mixed-motive situations,” those 
that challenge participants with deciding between cooperat-
ing with and competing with one another, with the possibil-
ity of each betraying the others through defection from any 
consensual agreements. My interest is not in grand-theoret-
ical attempts to explain the genesis of cooperative action in 
evolutionary terms (Cronk & Leech, 2013; Henrich & Hen-
rich, 2007), but rather the day-to-day decisions of people to 
forego some individual profit for the benefit of the group. My 
particular concern is with one type, which I will call a resource 
dilemma but which has also been referred to as a common-pool 
dilemma. In a resource dilemma, each individual must choose 
whether or not to “harvest” from a slowly-regenerating “re-
source pool” shared among everybody in the aggregate. 
Real-world resources such as grazing land, fish stocks, elec-
tric and geothermal reserves, and clean air and water serve 
as relevant instances.
I will also include scholarship on a second sub-type, the 
public goods dilemma. Here, each individual has the option of 
contributing to a common pool that, if but only if sufficient-
ly large, will benefit everybody in the aggregate. In contrast 
with resource dilemmas, any person’s use of a public good 
does not limit others’ uses of it. Examples include the deci-
sion to contribute to organizations that can benefit aggregates 
of people, such as labor unions, public television and radio 
stations, and professional associations. Public goods can be 
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divided into two ideal subtypes, continuous and step-level. 
A continuous public good is (in principle) established piece-
meal, with the opportunity for use increasing as contribu-
tions to it climb. To use Marwell and Oliver’s (1993) 
example, when a library institutes a book drive, the more 
books that are contributed, the larger the collection that all 
users can borrow. A step-level public good, in contrast, 
needs a certain level of contributions before it exists, after 
which (again in principle) further contributions are unnec-
essary. Marwell and Oliver’s relevant example is a bridge, 
which requires a given public expenditure to build but then 
can be used by all travelers without further investment. In 
real-life, most public goods are a combination of the two, 
as the library needs a public expenditure to open in the first 
place while the bridge requires additional resources for up-
keep and maintenance. Having said this, the experimental 
research cited in this essay is generally performed in pure 
step-level simulations. 
Two widely-cited works have provided justification for 
the claim that, as an expected consequence of individual 
rationality, social dilemmas will not be solved. In the case 
of the resource dilemma, Hardin’s (1968) introduction to 
the “tragedy of the commons” galvanized academic interest 
in its study; according to Google Scholar, as of when I write 
this (June 2017), it has been cited in other works more than 
34,000 times. Hardin envisioned a commons in which each 
member of an aggregate of people has the opportunity to 
graze their herd of sheep at no personal expense. It is indi-
vidually rational for each person to add additional sheep to 
his herd, as he would reap a gain without any obvious cost. 
However, if multiple members of the aggregate persist in 
this practice, eventually the grass will be worn to the ground 
and everyone would suffer. Hardin’s conclusion was that 
resource dilemmas could never be successfully managed 
without, in his words, “mutual coercion mutually agreed 
upon.” Yet, dozens of laboratory studies have made it plain 
that aggregates of people often willingly succeed in protect-
ing resource pools. More importantly, there are examples 
throughout the world of real-life resource pools maintained 
by large groups of public citizens, without government over-
sight, although usually with member surveillance and en-
forcement of use limits; examples include resources such as 
fisheries, water supplies, pasture lands, and forests. Political 
scientist Elinor Ostrom, who became the first female Nobel 
Lauriat in Economic Sciences for leading research efforts 
to explain the factors contributing to success or failure of 
such attempts, described a rural cooperative in Spain that 
has regulated water usage among farmers for centuries: rules 
officially established in 1435 A.D. codified practices in use 
since before 1238 A.D.
Turning to public goods, the general argument concern-
ing individual decisions whether to contribute are as follows: 
If a public good has been achieved, a member of the group 
for whom the good is relevant can take advantage of it wheth-
er or not she has contributed to its provision. In that case, 
the person is better off not contributing, because she will 
proverbially have her cake and eat it too (“I still have my 
book, and I can use the library anyway”). If the public good 
is not achieved, any contribution goes to waste, so a con-
tributor is better off keeping it in the first place (“I’m glad I 
didn’t waste my money on that public radio station that 
never got off the ground”). In summary, the individually-
rational choice is never to contribute, as the chooser reaps 
higher reward whether or not the public good is attained. 
Olson (1965), in a book with impact analogous to Hardin 
(more than 38,000 citations on Google Scholar), provides a 
more subtle argument; that members of the group for whom 
a possible public good is relevant will compare the personal 
benefit from the achievement of the public good to the per-
sonal cost of contributing to its provision. As most public 
goods are at least partly step-level, i.e. take a considerable 
expenditure to get started, the needed personal contribution 
may be significant whereas the potential benefits are uncer-
tain and out of individual control. As a consequence, the 
disincentive to contribute generally outweighs the incentive. 
There are circumstances in which group members will con-
clude that the benefit will outweigh the cost, and enough of 
them will contribute to institute the public good; these will 
be addressed later in this essay. In general, however, a public 
good will not be achieved without either compulsory contri-
butions, such as taxes, or incentives designed for individual 
group members; the latter can include not only economic 
incentives but also the psychological (self-satisfaction, self-
esteem) and social (friendship and fellowship).
Finally, there are circumstances (known by experimental-
ists as give-or-take-some) that combine aspects of resource and 
public goods dilemmas by allowing people to either contrib-
ute to or withdraw from a public resource. Budescu and 
McCarter ( 2012; McCarter, Budescu & Scheffran, 2011) 
provide examples of give-and-take circumstances. For in-
stance, Eastern Europeans with sufficient means contribute 
money to a pool that those in need can take from; members 
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the presence of communication and the proposed reasons 
for its efficacy has been left unexplained. An inspiration for 
this essay are the findings in a series of studies (Pavitt, 2011, 
2016) intended to tease out the impact of communication 
content on small group performance and group member 
perceptions during experimental resource dilemma simula-
tions. In summary, these findings were as follows:
1: Almost all of the groups chose to cooperate, came up 
with a strategy insuring approximately equal harvests (except 
when the reward for harvesting varied among members), and 
followed through with the strategy; defectors were very rare.
2: The most prevalent topic of discussion was the 
formulation of game strategy, followed by asking for and 
providing information relevant to the game itself.
3: In contrast with the above-cited studies, explicitly-
voiced agreements were rare, with acceptance more often 
implied by members reiterating and clarifying the strategy.
4: Success at maintaining the resource pool and attaining 
relatively high individual reward over the long haul was more 
likely to the extent that agreed-upon strategies were specific 
(e.g., “Let’s take out five points each round”) rather than 
general (“Let’s take out a small amount each round”).
5: Discussion relevant to decision procedure was posi-
tively associated with resource pool maintenance and long-
term harvest, whereas information about the game was 
negatively linked with these outcomes. 
6: The tendency toward equal harvests was not associ-
ated with specific discussion content, excepting when the 
reward for harvesting varied among members.
7: In post-discussion questionnaires, participants almost 
universally reported high levels of group cooperation and 
coordination, trust in one another, and a sense of group 
identity.
8: To the extent that variation existed among these post-
discussion judgments, higher levels were associated with talk 
relevant to discussion procedure and specific strategy and 
negatively linked with discussion about general strategy and 
information about the game. They were also positively cor-
related with long-term amount and equality of harvest.
In essence, the specific goal of this essay is to answer the 
question of how the opportunity for the members of small 
groups to directly interact with one another usually encour-
ages them to cooperate with one another during social dilem-
mas. What follows is an attempt to build on earlier 
theoretical efforts (Bornstein, 1992b; Ostrom, 2003; Schro-
eder et al., 1995) in light of the just-described findings and 
of the Church of Latter Day Saints do the same with provi-
sions. Other cases include “free stores,” in which people place 
no-longer-wanted items that others who want them can take, 
and give-or-take-a-penny jars at checkout counters.
As with resource dilemmas, aggregates of people often 
succeed in attaining step-level public goods in experimental 
simulations, and the real-world is full of professional asso-
ciations, charities, and other public institutions that succeed 
due to the willingness of people to contribute to them, al-
though admittedly with individual incentives for the 
contribution. Further, contrary to the classic Hardin and 
Olson analyses, what these circumstances present to the 
participant is a conflict between individual and collective 
forms of rationality (van Lange & Messick, 1996). In contrast 
with the individually-rational choice just described, the ra-
tional decision for the aggregate as a whole is often to con-
tribute enough to attain the public good or maintain the 
viability of the resource pool. In addition, having information 
about the behavioral intentions of other group members can 
alleviate some of the uncertainty about the consequences of 
one’s own decision. Given this, it should not be surprising 
that, among the many factors that have been examined, the 
most powerful factor increasing the odds of participants 
opting for the collectively rational option is the opportunity 
for communication among them (Balliet, 2010; Sally, 1995). 
Based on findings from experimental simulations, Bornstein 
(1992b) proposed a set of reasons why communication can 
engender cooperation in social dilemmas: it allows for the 
clarification of available choices, enhances trust among par-
ticipants, reinforces the activation of relevant social norms, 
encourages a group identity, and allows for the establishment 
of a collective strategy and member commitments to adhere 
to it. Many of these factors also appear in Ostrom’s (2003) 
process model for the management of real-world resource 
dilemmas and Schroeder, Sibicky and Irwin’s (1995) frame-
work for describing individual decisions when facing social 
dilemmas. 
However, none of the studies inspiring those proposals 
included the detailed examination of the content of com-
munication occurring when groups face social dilemmas. 
The only studies published before 2005 examining any com-
munication content (Bornstein, 1992a; Hackett, Schlager, & 
Walker, 1994; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes, 1988) were 
limited to noting explicit agreements to contribute to a pub-
lic good. As a consequence, the precise relationship between 
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Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2010). Group assurance 
games are likewise public goods games in which all must 
contribute to be successful, and multi-person prisoner’s di-
lemmas are in essence resource dilemmas; see Franzen’s 
(1995) description of each. 
Even within these boundaries, the available literature is 
enormous, encompassing primarily social and personality 
psychology, sociology, management science, political science, 
behavioral economics, and ecology, along with occasional 
contributions from other fields. My strategy in examining 
this work was to read available books and use them to identify 
key references. I proceeded with a method analogous to 
snowball sampling, following relevant citation chains both 
backward (what was cited in the key references) and forward 
(who cited the key references) until I came to the end of each. 
It is likely that I overlooked some pertinent work; hopefully, 
future efforts of this type will be able to include what is 
missed here. Another decision I had to make concerned 
choosing what to reference when a critical finding was rep-
licated numerous times. In this case, I included three or four 
exemplars that appeared to be particularly influential.
The Cooperative Mechanisms
Synopsis
The decision process undertaken by the participants in a 
group social dilemma differs substantially from the strict 
cost/benefit analysis presumed by Hardin (1968) and Olson 
(1965). Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004) adopted 
March’s (1994) AIR (Appropriateness/Identity/ Rules) mod-
el for general decision making (1994) to the specific social 
dilemma context. March characterized decision making as 
a series of three questions people ask themselves: “What kind 
of situation is this,” “What kind of person am I,” and “What 
does a person like me do in a situation like this?” Weber et 
al. added the additional and critical question “How do oth-
er people understand this situation” to the mix. The typical 
participant’s answer [with my comments bracketed within 
it, and multiple possibilities depending on the type of social 
dilemma] is as follows: “I am a member of a group with a 
task [public goods/resource dilemma] requiring me to make 
a decision whether or not to cooperate with the others, with 
my choice affecting all of us. As a member of a group, I am 
available research, in so doing providing a more sophisti-
cated role for communication than in previous models. This 
includes linking communication with the rest of a set of what 
I (Pavitt, 2011, 2016) have previously called the “cooperative 
mechanisms” germane to group conduct during social dilem-
mas: group identity, relevant social norms (reciprocity and 
equity), and trust and trustworthiness. In short, communica-
tion functions in two distinguishable ways, in terms of the 
opportunity itself and the content of what is said. In the 
following sections, after a summary of my method, I will 
introduce these cooperative mechanisms, describe other fac-
tors significantly impinging on the process, most notably 
group size and social value orientation, and propose a set of 
propositions and a model describing how their interrelation-
ships impact on group cooperation during social dilemmas.
Method
I begin this discussion of the method that I used with a 
description of the boundaries within which the concerns of 
this paper reside. First, although much of what is included 
is relevant to larger aggregates, my primary interest is in the 
small group. Attempts to define the dividing line between 
small and large groups by size have tended to choose some 
arbitrary number, usually somewhere around ten. A more 
principled way of defining what makes a group small was 
offered by Bales (1950, p. 33); “any number of persons en-
gaged in interaction with one another in a single [or series 
of] . . . meeting[s] in which each member can . . . give some 
reaction to each of the others as an individual person, even 
though it be only to recall that the other was present.”
Having said this, dyads, i.e. aggregates of two people, do 
not count as groups. The distinction between dyads and 
groups is particularly germane to the social dilemma circum-
stance, as it differentiates when those that cooperate can and 
cannot identity any defecting participant. Due to their fun-
damentally dyadic nature, some social dilemma circum-
stances, such as the classic prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport & 
Chammah, 1965), the chicken game (Rapoport & Chammah, 
1966; Taylor & Hill, 1982), and the assurance game (Skyrms, 
2004; Taylor & Hill, 1982), are not included in this review. 
Studies labeled as group chicken games, in which everyone 
prospers if enough members contribute an endowment, are 
in actuality either public goods or resource dilemmas and 
will be treated as such (Bornstein, Budescu, & Zamir, 1997; 
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(such as “we divide resources equally”), values (“one should 
contribute toward the establishment of a public good”), and 
goals (“we will make optimal use of the resource”). In addi-
tion, this self-definition encourages group members to accept 
these group beliefs as their own, extinguishing the distinction 
between individual and group interests (Brewer & Schneider, 
1990; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). It 
would follow that an aggregate facing a social dilemma 
would be particularly prone to conceive themselves as a 
group, given both that their outcomes are interdependent 
and that, to a large extent, they share the same fate. 
Note that the examples of group beliefs listed above begin 
with “we.” Gilbert (1989) stressed the importance of collec-
tive pronoun usage (we, us, our) in the process of group for-
mation. An informal content analysis of the transcripts from 
Pavitt (2016) revealed that the first usage of “we” or analo-
gous pronouns (us, our, ourselves) occurred on average on 
the third speaking turn, and there were about two times as 
many references to “we” than to “I” and its analogs (me, my, 
mine, myself) in the first minute of discussion. What’s more, 
most speaking units containing “I” either referred to past 
individual harvest or included constructions such as “I 
guess” or “I think,” whereas discussion of strategy or game 
rules was almost totally in terms of “we.” Dawes, van de 
Kragt and Orbell (1990) made the same observation about 
collective pronoun usage in their groups. In contrast, in an 
experimental study of analogously-zero history groups mak-
ing decisions concerning classic scenarios demonstrating 
judgmental bias resulting from cognitive heuristics (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974, 1981), the ratio was about 5 to 1 favoring 
“I” and its analogs over “we” and its equivalents (Pavitt & 
Aloia, 2009). Even in a sample of standing student groups 
with one assignment working together already under their 
belts, when deciding on a topic for a second project, the 
proportion leaned toward “I” by 3 to 2 (Pavitt, Whitchurch, 
McClurg, & Petersen, 1995). The point is not that the par-
ticipants in these two studies did not see themselves as groups 
– quite the contrary, they probably did – but that those expe-
riencing the resource dilemma together most certainly did. 
There is, then, good reason to believe that the very fact of 
experiencing a social dilemma together is sufficient for a 
preliminary perception of group identity to form among the 
participants.
The establishment of a group identity, among other im-
pacts, activates the salience of relevant group norms. I will 
turn to those next. 
bound by a set of rules [norms]. These rules include recipro-
cating the actions performed by other group members and 
[depending on the type of social dilemma] contributing 
equally/equitably to the provision of a shared resource/prof-
iting equally/equitably from a resource already in place. 
Until provided with evidence to the contrary, I will assume 
that the other people also see themselves as members of this 
group bound by the same rules. This implies that I should 
trust that they will act consistently with them. For this rea-
son, I will also act consistently with these rules.” This 
thought process is encouraged by the opportunity for the 
members of the group to communicate with one another. It 
alone, however, does not insure that the resource will be 
successfully achieved/efficiently used. For this insurance, 
the members must agree upon a strategy for action. Any 
agreement will, in turn, reinforce the shared perception of 
group identity, the salience of the relevant norms, and pre-
liminary levels of trust. If group members do act in accor-
dance with their agreement, they will have demonstrated 
trustworthiness, further strengthening these cooperative 
mechanisms, whereas defection from the agreement will 
encourage others to spurn their agreements in turn.
The following sections will describe each of the coopera-
tive mechanisms, and their interrelationships, in detail. 
Group Identity
In a widely cited essay, Campbell (1958) proposed that 
basic Gestaltist perceptual principles such as proximity (ob-
jects relatively close to one another are perceived as a unit), 
similarity (objects alike in some easily identifiable way are 
perceived as a unit) and common fate (objects sharing the 
same outcome are perceived as a unit) are potentially as 
relevant to human interactive behavior as they are to any 
organization of inanimate objects. If this proposal is in any 
way correct, then identification as a group of an aggregate 
of people who are proximate, similar, and share a common 
fate is a natural outcome of fundamental perceptual pro-
cesses (see Zander, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1960 for research 
support). Since the early days of research pertaining to social 
identity (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), the evidence suggests that an 
action as simple as merely telling an aggregate of people that 
they are a group is often sufficient for the aggregate to define 
itself as such. The collective belief that “we are a group,” 
characterized by Bar-Tal (1998) as the fundamental group belief, 
is the precursor to other group beliefs about relevant norms 
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of wine). The concern here is for a class of norms that most 
writers call social norms (Brennan et al. used the term moral 
instead). These are norms relevant to more basic values con-
cerning the qualities of sharing, reciprocating, helping, pro-
moting egalitarianism, and insuring social equality. What 
these have in common is applying pressure for people to act 
unselfishly (Sripada & Stich, 2006). For this reason, the pres-
ence of social norms is particularly helpful in mixed-motive 
situations, in which there is incentive for selfishness and it 
is difficult for each participant to influence or predict how 
one another acts (Coleman, 1990; Voss, 2001). 
Henrich and Henrich (2007; see also Bicchieri, 2006; 
Ullmann-Margalit, 1977) distinguished between cooperation 
norms, which are relevant when there is concern about defec-
tion in social dilemmas, and coordination norms, when such 
concern is largely missing. Cooperation norms instruct 
people to cooperate; coordination norms tell them how to go 
about it. According to Ullmann-Margalit (1977), cooperation 
norms (which she referred to as Prisoner’s Dilemma norms) 
tend to evolve when mutual cooperation is individually bet-
ter than mutual defection, but individual defection when the 
others cooperate is the best individual option of all. For this 
reason, conformity to the norm requires either some form of 
coercion, which can come from external sanctions but also 
either internal punishments such as guilt and shame or feel-
ings of obligation. 
The acceptance of cooperation as appropriate by all in-
volved parties turns mixed-motive situations into coordina-
tion problems. A coordination problem exists when a group 
of interdependent people intending to cooperate must choose 
among two or more possible behavioral options allowing 
them to do so. To use an example from Thomas, DeScioli, 
Haque, and Pinker (2014), two friends want to meet for cof-
fee, but they need to decide between Starbucks and Peet’s. 
The trick for solving a coordination problem is finding a 
mutually acceptable option (Cronk & Leech, 2013; Lewis, 
1969; Schelling, 1960) and insuring that the decision to 
choose that option becomes common knowledge among par-
ticipants. In these cases, as coordinated action results in 
better individual outcomes than defection when facing co-
ordination problems, coordination norms tend to be self-
perpetuating and require neither sanctions nor feelings of 
obligation to operate (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977).
Social norms become salient when there is something 
about the situation that cues their relevance (Bicchieri, 2006). 
For most people, the experience of group membership in the 
Reciprocity and Equity Norms
There are significant differences among commentators 
concerning the defining characteristics of a norm, along with 
pretty much every implication of those characteristics. The 
following definition is distilled from several published ac-
counts, including some in obvious conflict (e.g., Bicchieri, 
2006; Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, & Southwood, 2013). A 
norm is a situation-specific regulative (i.e., behavioral) rule 
relevant to a given social collectivity with the following 
characteristics:
1 – each typical member of the social collectivity expects 
each other typical member to conform with the rule,
2 – each typical member of the social collectivity believes 
that each other typical member ought to conform to the rule, 
and believes it correct to disapprove of actions contrary to 
the rule,
3 – each typical member of the social collectivity believes 
that each other typical member has the same expectation 
and belief for that first member’s actions,
4 – these expectations and beliefs are common knowledge 
within the social collectivity; i.e., Ann is aware of the norm, 
Ann knows that Bob is aware of the norm, Ann knows that 
Bob knows that Ann is aware of the norm, and so on, and 
the same for Bob regarding Ann.
One of the disagreements concerns whether actual be-
havior has to conform to the norm.  Brennan et al. (2013) 
have argued against this claim, although acknowledging that 
a norm obviously flouted by most will cease being a norm 
soon enough. Norms provide expectations for behavior for 
which participants expect some form of reward for following 
– either tangible, such as financial gain, or intangible, such 
as other’s or self’s approval – and make behavior more pre-
dictable (Brennan et al., 2013; Coleman, 1990; Homans, 
1974). If norms are sufficiently internalized, then their viola-
tion is associated with guilt or shame on the part of the defec-
tor and anger on the part of the victim (Henrich & Henrich, 
2007). In fact, Brennan et al. considered the most general 
function of norms to be holding one another accountable for 
their actions.
There are many different types of norms, such as legal 
(i.e., the norms undergirding laws), aesthetic (e.g., in Western 
classical musical composition, the use of microtones is 
frowned upon, although they are fine in many other genres), 
linguistic (e.g., forms of politeness), and what I will call 
etiquette norms (e.g., if invited to a dinner party, bring a bottle 
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both norms. For example, people are more selfish when:
1 – There is some perceived justification for taking more 
or giving less, such as an individual’s belief that they have 
greater ability at a relevant task (Joireman, Kuhlman, & 
Okuda, 1994; Samuelson & Allison, 1994), greater respon-
sibility for the group’s outcome (e.g., a designated group 
leader; Samuelson & Allison, 1994), or that they had put in 
greater effort to get their allotment (van Dijk & Wilke, 1994).
2 – It is difficult to discern how much is equal or equi-
table, as when a resource pool is perceptually difficult to 
divide up (Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl, 1992), or group 
size is particularly large (Allison et al., 1992), or there is 
uncertainty in how large the pool actually is (Rapoport, 
Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 1992).
Along with a perception of group identity, the salience of 
reciprocity and equity norms provide a preliminary reason 
for group members to trust one another; but a perception of 
mutual trustworthiness must await cooperative activity. The 
next section addresses these two concepts.
Trust and Trustworthiness
The concepts of trust and trustworthiness have been well 
conceptualized by writers in the social sciences, particu-
larly political science. Both concepts are inherently contex-
tual; paraphrasing Hardin (2002), person X trusts a specific 
person Y to reflect trustworthiness in a specific situation Z. 
More precisely, trust and trustworthiness are relevant during 
situations in which the outcomes for the aforementioned 
person X, whom I will henceforth call the truster, are at least 
partly dependent on the actions of person Y, whom I will 
call the trusted. In such situations, the trusted has the option 
of acting either in the truster’s benefit or to the truster’s det-
riment. Trust exists when the truster believes that the trust-
ed will act in the interests of the truster in that given situation 
(Hardin, 2002). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, p. 712; 
see also, Blomqvist, 1997) supplied a good definition: “the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of an-
other party based on the expectation that the other will per-
form a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control that other party.” It is 
important to note Barber’s (1983) distinction between this 
sense of trust, relevant to the intent of the trusted, from two 
others. One of the others is germane to the persistence of the 
natural order of things, such as we trust that when we take 
a step, the world beneath our feet will not suddenly disappear. 
context of social dilemmas apparently cues a desire for fair-
ness, which is then translated into the activation of the norm 
for reciprocity (Foddy & Yamagishi, 2009; Ostrom, 2003). 
When the reciprocity norm is operating, if Ann does some-
thing for Bob, then Ann expects Bob to reciprocate, and Bob 
has an obligation to do so. There is ample research evidence 
of reciprocity serving as a behavioral standard in social di-
lemmas. A majority of participants match both the average 
amount of member contributions (Cress & Kimmerle, 2007; 
Croson, 2007; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001) and any 
increase or decrease in this average (Croson, Fatas and 
Neugebauer, 2005; Guttman, 1986; Keser & van Winden, 
2000) in public good experiments.  
When in operation, the norm for reciprocity serves as a 
cooperation norm, turning social dilemmas into coordina-
tion problems (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). The desire for 
fairness then points to the norm for equity as a salient guide 
for coordination. In the social dilemma arena, the equity 
norm usually translates into equality of allocation as an 
operating background assumption when participants have 
equivalent opportunities to harvest (Samuelson & Allison, 
1994; van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). Messick (1993) described 
how equality makes a good decision heuristic in this circum-
stance. When deemed appropriate to the circumstance, it is 
easy to work with arithmetically; when judged to be inap-
propriate, it can be used as an anchor that is then adjusted 
in favor of those deemed deserving extra (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, for discussion of the anchoring-and-ad-
justment heuristic). There is evidence that equality consid-
erations are salient in individual choice during social 
dilemmas (Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 
1983; van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992; van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & 
Metman, 1999). When participants have unequal opportuni-
ties to harvest resources, the desire for fairness often leads 
those with greater opportunity to harvest fewer resources 
than those with lesser opportunity in an apparent attempt 
to maintain an equality norm in total monetary gain (Bu-
descu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; van Dijk et al., 1999). 
The same motive led participants with greater resources to 
contribute more to achieving a public good than those with 
less (Marwell & Ames, 1979; Rapoport & Suleiman, 1993). 
In Pavitt, Zingerman, Towey, & McFeeters (2006), some of 
the groups with unequal reward for harvest made an ex-
plicit verbalized decision that those disadvantaged should 
harvest more than those advantaged. 
However, several circumstances can serve to short-circuit 
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intends to act in the truster’s interest, based on what Thiel-
mann and Hilbig (2015) called trust cues such as the truster’s 
past actions, direct communication with the truster (to be 
discussed in detail below), and information about the trust-
er obtained from third parties (the trusted’s reputation). As 
such, a decision based on knowledge-based trust would be 
made more in terms of risk than uncertainty. If the relevant 
evidence is sufficiently persuasive, it can be said that the 
trusted is deserving of trust; in other words, is trustworthy 
(Hardin, 2002). The two should be distinguished, as trust is 
a judgment concerning the future (“Person Y will act in my 
interests”) and trustworthiness a belief about the past (“Per-
son Y has shown herself to be worthy of trust”). If the trust-
ed does display trustworthiness, then the trusted has good 
reason to expect the truster to benefit the trusted if their 
respective roles reverse at some future time (Coleman, 1990). 
As such, trust and trustworthiness should be mutually rein-
forcing across a sequence of relevant circumstances. Both 
trust and trustworthiness are cognitions and neither deci-
sions nor actions. As such, the presence of trust must be 
distinguished from the decision to act on it and the action 
itself (Hardin, 2002; Mayer et al., 1995). After all, we can 
choose to act without trust or trust without subsequent ac-
tion. Sanctioning systems that punish non-cooperators may 
result in cooperative behavior, but at the expense of trust 
development and, if the system is subsequently abolished, 
future cooperation (Mulder, van Dijk, DeCremer, & Wilke, 
2006; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  
Situational trust is the judgment that the trusted can be 
relied on at the given moment. Not surprisingly, both gener-
alized (Mori, 1996; Yamagishi, 1986, 1992) and knowledge-
based (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Thielmann and 
Hilbig, 2015) forms of trust are associated with situational 
trust in social dilemmas. Thielmann and Hilbig also describe 
situational impacts, such as the benefits and costs of loyalty 
versus betrayal, as involved in the judgment. In addition, 
there is evidence that group identity contributes to the estab-
lishment of situational trust (Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 
2009; Platow, Foddy, Yamagishi, Lim & Chow, 2012). As 
potential explanations for this association, Foddy and Yam-
agishi (2009) argued that membership in a group implies an 
expectation of mutual reciprocity, whereas Messick and 
Kramer (2001) proposed the existence of a social rule stating 
that trust and trustworthiness are required among group 
members. This latter proposal is buttressed by evidence that 
people view trust as a moral commitment, and sometimes 
The second pertains to trusting the trusted’s ability; to para-
phrase Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) example, we may 
think that the pilot wants to get us safely to our destination 
but lack faith in his flying skill. The concern herein is with 
the intent of the trusted only.
Trust is not normally an issue in circumstances in which 
the interests of both parties are aligned, such that an action 
to injure the truster will do the same for the trusted. Yam-
agishi and Yamagishi (1994) used the term assurance rather 
than trust for this circumstance. It is also irrelevant to con-
texts in which the concerns of both are opposed, because the 
truster has no reason to expect actions in her behalf. It follows 
that trust is most relevant to mixed-motive situations. The 
specifics of the situation are essential in determining trust; 
I may trust someone with ten cents, but not with ten dollars 
(Hardin, 2002). To help define the truster’s dilemma, it is 
useful to apply a fundamental decision-theoretic distinction 
between decisions under risk and decisions under uncer-
tainty. When the truster has knowledge relevant to the trust-
ed’s likelihood of acting in the trusted’s behalf, the truster’s 
decision whether to trust is based on the risk associated with 
the trusted’s possible defection. If instead the truster has no 
such information, the truster is making a decision based on 
her tolerance for uncertainty. It follows that the truster would 
have less confidence in the ability to make that decision when 
made under uncertainty than under risk. 
That decision itself is the product of two factors. The first 
factor goes under several names; consistently with Ensminger 
(2001), I will call it generalized trust.  It comprises a willingness 
to take risks with strangers in mixed-motive situations (Har-
din, 2002; Thielmann, & Hilbig, 2015). Generalized trust is 
synonymous with the idea of trust as an individual disposi-
tion, for which both Rotter’s (1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale 
and Yamagishi’s (1986) Trust Scale were expressly designed 
to measure. Generalized trust is partly a product of the de-
gree to which the truster has typically received benefits from 
other people during past experiences in mixed motive situ-
ations (Hardin, 2002). It is also a consequence of the extent 
to which the truster believes that the average person would 
comply with situationally-relevant norms, particularly those 
suggesting reciprocity (Tyler, 2001). If a decision is made 
solely due to degree of generalized trust, it would more like-
ly qualify as made under uncertainty than under risk (Ens-
minger, 2001; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994)
The second factor is what Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
(1994) called knowledge-based trust, a belief that the trusted 
The Path to Cooperative Action during Group Social Dilemmas
63 2018, 6, 54-83
horn, 1996; Rutte & Wilke, 1992) and indirectly in others 
(Alcock & Mansell, 1977; Allison & Kerr, 1994; Bouas 
Henry, 2000; Mulder, van Dijk, DeCremer, & Wilke, 2006; 
Stouten, DeCremer, & van Dijk, 2009; see Balliet & Van 
Lange, 2013, for meta-analysis). Moreover, cooperation is 
enhanced by evidence of other’s trustworthiness (Tenbrunsel 
& Messick, 1999). 
Bicchieri (2002; Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007) claimed that 
social norm activation is the key to cooperation in social 
dilemmas. The discussion above cites numerous studies in-
dicating the impact of reciprocity and equity norms on co-
operation; in addition, two of them (Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Keser & Van Winden, 2000) emphasized the point that group 
members’ cooperation is conditional on one another main-
taining these norms. Dawes et al. (1990) opted for group 
identity as the most important ingredient in cooperation, 
and it has been linked to cooperation in studies of resource 
(Baird, 1982; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 
1984) and public goods (Alfano & Marwell, 1980; DeCremer 
& van Dijk, 2002a; Rubenstein, Watzke, Doktor, & Dana, 
1975; Watzke, Dana, Doktor, & Rubenstein, 1972) dilemmas. 
In the Alfano and Marwell study, participants were more 
likely to believe that others would contribute when the whole 
group would benefit rather than each individual. In the most 
persuasive demonstration, Kramer and Goldman (1995) and 
Smith et al. (2003) noted correlations between participant 
perceptions of group identity and cooperation.
Communication
Meta-analyses (Balliet, 2010; Sally, 1995) have demon-
strated that the most important factor influencing coopera-
tiveness in social dilemmas is the presence versus absence 
of communication among group members. The opportunity 
to communicate has, in some studies, increased cooperation 
rates to close to one hundred percent, and in so doing dis-
confirmed the pessimism inherent in Hardin (1968) and Ol-
son (1965). Concentrating on the types of social dilemmas 
of interest here, more than ten published resource dilemma 
studies with widely varying methods have shown the pres-
ence of communication to increase the proportion of par-
ticipants cooperating, the maintenance of the resource pool, 
the total amount of points harvested, and the number of 
rounds before resource depletion, along with various relevant 
self-report variables. representative examples in different 
disciplines include Bischoff (2007), Dawes, McTavish, and 
act as if they trust even when they lack confidence that the 
trusted will act to their benefit (Dunning, Anderson, Schlöss-
er, Ehlebrecht, & Fetchenhauer (2014).
With three of the generative mechanisms in place, group 
members are ready to cooperate. Cooperation and its link-
ages with these three will be the next topic covered; the 
critical role of communication will be described after that 
coverage.
Cooperation
As with trust, there are multiple senses of the term coop-
eration. Elster (1989) described five, one of which ( joint ven-
tures) is the connotation most relevant here. In this sense, to 
cooperate means to “co-operate”; to do things in tandem 
(Cronk & Leech, 2013). Cooperation in this sense occurs 
when members of a collectivity are interdependent and share 
a goal only achieved through coordinated action, when these 
two facts are common knowledge among the members, and 
when they have an agreed-upon action plan (Pruitt & Kim-
mel, 1977; Schelling, 1971). Cooperation is the norm for par-
ticipants in social dilemma studies, and when asked why 
they did so, the majority of research participants studied by 
Dawes et al. (1990) claimed it “the right thing to do” in these 
circumstances.
The three previously described cooperative mechanisms 
work together to make cooperation the “right thing to do.” 
To begin, Boone and Buck (2003) emphasized the importance 
of reciprocated beliefs in the trustworthiness of each par-
ticipant for cooperation. It should then not be surprising that 
an association between cooperation and one or another mea-
sure of generalized trust (Rotter, 1967; Yamagishi, 1986) has 
been noted in both experimental (Brann & Foddy, 1987; Cox, 
Ostrom, Walker, Castillo, Coleman, Holahan, Schoon, & 
Steed, 2009; Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; Yamagi-
shi, 1986, 1992) and real-life (Joireman, Van Lange, Kuhl-
man, Van Vugt, & Shelley, 1997; Van Lange, Van Vugt, 
Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998) contexts.  In Yamagishi (1986), 
high trusters contributed less to a fund for punishing defec-
tors than low trusters, which likely implies they were more 
likely to believe that sanctioning was not be needed; this 
result was, however, not replicated in Yamagishi (1992). 
There is also evidence that situational trust, operationalized 
as the expectation of others’ cooperation, can be linked with 
cooperation, directly in some studies (Messick, Wilke, Brew-
er, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Parks, Henager, & Scama-
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(group identity development, trust emergence, norm sa-
lience), along with helping group members come to under-
stand the situation through clarification of the implications 
of various choices, allowing group members to coordinate 
their actions through exchanging information about intend-
ed choices, and providing the opportunity to form agree-
ments, make promises, and commit to cooperate. Bornstein’s 
list does not distinguish between factors that occur as con-
sequence of the opportunity to talk and factors that follow 
from what is explicitly discussed. That opportunity in and 
of itself encourages the formation of a shared group identity 
(Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 
2006; Jans, Leach, Garcia, & Postmes, 2015), reinforces the 
relevance of reciprocity and equity norms (Bicchieri, 2002; 
Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007; Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko, 2010), 
and fosters situational trust in the form of expectations of 
one another’s cooperation (Boone & Buck, 2003; Bornstein, 
1992a; Braver & Wilson, 1986; Cohen et al., 2010; Kerr & 
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994, although perhaps only for those 
with high generalized trust; Mori, 1996). The relationships 
between communication opportunity and these other coop-
erative mechanisms are all central to Ostrom’s (2003) process 
model.
Turning to what is explicitly discussed, the fourth pos-
sibility on Bornstein’s (1992b) list, that communication in-
creases group members’ understanding of the situation, has 
failed to gain research support. Edney and Harper (1978) 
noted that warning group members about the impact of re-
source pool depletion and providing group members with a 
good strategy for maintaining the resource pool did not help 
the groups perform better when they could not directly in-
teract. Likewise, either receiving comments from earlier 
public goods game players or overhearing a discussion from 
an earlier game did not increase cooperation over a no-com-
munication condition (Brosig, Weimann, & Ockenfels, 2003; 
Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). In my work (this and 
subsequent mentions in this section are from Pavitt (2011), 
discussion concerning game rules was negatively associated 
with group performance. The implication is not that under-
standing the game is unnecessary, but that communication 
cannot overcome misunderstanding, and the impact of talk 
must be found elsewhere.
Nonetheless, communication must be task relevant for it 
to impact on cooperation and group performance. Irrelevant 
discussion appears to be no better than no talk at all (Bouas 
& Komorita, 1996; Cohen et al., 2010; Dawes et al., 1977), 
Shaklee (1977), Edney and Harper (1978), and Janssen and 
Ostrom (2008). Not all of these studies have been performed 
with college students; for example, Cardenas, Ahn, & Ostrom 
(2004) did so with rural Columbians (see also Lopez and 
Villamayor-Tomas, 2017). Only two published studies of 
which I am aware failed to replicate the tendency: Caldwell 
(1976), in which communication was restricted to only one 
minute every five rounds, and one conducted in several rural 
villages in India (Ghate, Ghate, & Ostrom, 2013), likely due 
to pre-existing cooperative social norms. Even in the case of 
Ghate et al., the presence of communication was still suc-
cessful in inducing greater equality in harvests. In addition, 
Jerdee and Rosen (1974) and Janssen (2010) noted coopera-
tion to increase across rounds with communication and de-
crease across rounds without it, and Cardenas (2011) 
discussed the fact that repeated communication encourages 
cooperation more than does a one-shot talk.
Again with widely varying methods, at least twenty pub-
lished public-goods reports have revealed the presence of 
communication to increase the probability of individual 
contribution to the public good, the group provision of that 
good, and various self-report measures. Representative ex-
emplars in various disciplines include Bouas and Komorita 
(1996), Braver and Wilson (1986), Frohlich & Oppenheimer 
(1998), and Ostrom and Walker (1991). Even Twitter-sized 
chunks encouraged greater contribution rates than no inter-
action at all (Mäs & Dijkstra, 2014). In Kinukawa, Saijo, and 
Une, (2000), cooperation rates were greatest when all six 
members of the group could interact between rounds, lower 
when only two members could communicate at a time but 
each person’s interaction partner changed between rounds, 
lower yet when the same two members could communicate 
between rounds, and lowest with no communication.  The 
only published works I know of in which communication 
did not have a clear positive impact was Palfrey and Rosen-
thal (1991), in which interaction was limited to signaling 
whether one was or was not going to contribute to the public 
good, and a condition in Mäs and Dijkstra, in which mes-
sages were limited to standardized statements of behavioral 
intention; and even here, the impact was intermediate be-
tween no and Twitter-sized discussion.
The important theoretical question is to determine why 
communication works as it does. A number of conceivable 
mechanisms have been proposed, with Bornstein (1992b) 
providing a useful list of possibilities. Bornstein’s list includes 
all three of the previously-described cooperative mechanisms 
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performance. In other work, voiced commitments appear to 
have been significant in some studies (Hopthrow & Hulbert, 
2005; Neidert & Linder, 1990; Samuelson & Watrous-Rodri-
guez, 2010), although less so when unaccompanied by free 
talk (Wilson & Sell, 1997), and not at all in others (Bochet, 
Page, & Putterman, 2006; Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1991). 
Fourth, communication reinforces the continued develop-
ment of group identity. As mentioned earlier, action phi-
losopher Gilbert (1989) stressed the role of communication 
within an aggregate as a necessary part of the process of 
becoming a group. One person in the aggregate performs an 
initiatory use of a collective pronoun, in a sense expressing 
the readiness to share in an action with the others, and the 
others express their acceptance of this use through its rep-
etition (closing “we”), in so doing making it common knowl-
edge that a group has formed. Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas 
(2017) uncovered some evidence that group identity-enhanc-
ing comments indicating approval and social support of 
other group members improves group performance. Finally, 
communication reiterates the importance of relevant social 
norms. Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2017) observed coop-
eration to improve with negative comments about past out-
comes, which they believed to make such norms salient to 
members of the groups.
Communication performs further functions once the 
game has begun. There is evidence that positive reinforce-
ment for past cooperation is linked with good group outcomes 
(Mäs & Dijkstra, 2014). Discussion may help heal the wound 
of betrayal; when participants in a public goods game dis-
covered that a confederate “partner” had failed to cooperate, 
messages from the partner explaining and apologizing for 
the failure led to increased cooperation from the participants 
when compared to an absence of these messages (Tazelaar, 
Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2005). In contrast, defection tends 
to elicit sharp verbal responses (e.g., “Some scumbucket is 
investing more than we agreed on”), which often were suc-
cessful in gaining compliance in later rounds (Dawes et al., 
1977; Ostrom & Walker, 1991).
Influences on the Cooperative Mechanisms
I next turn to some factors that influence the degree to 
which the cooperative mechanisms operate during social 
dilemmas. Some require little explication. For example, fol-
lowing in Olson’s (1965) footsteps, both Ostrom (2003) and 
and was unrelated with cooperation and successful resource 
harvesting in my research.  In contrast, task-relevant content 
has an integral impact on group performance. First, the ver-
balized establishment of a procedure for conducting the dis-
cussion sets the stage for the other functions necessary for 
successful outcomes (Pavitt, 2011). Second, discussion pro-
vides the opportunity to create an action plan (Koukoumelis, 
Levati, & Weisser, 2012; Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2013). 
In my work, the generation of specific strategies was the most 
prevalent discussion topic and the most strongly associated 
with positive results, whereas general strategy talk was coun-
terproductive; Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas (2017) noted 
analogous relationships in their field experiment. 
Second, communication is integral to the establishment 
of common knowledge concerning the action plan (Ostrom, 
2003). The role of common knowledge in the genesis of col-
lective action has been well conceptualized by philosophers 
of action. In Tuomela’s (2007) bulletin-board metaphor, one 
member of a group explicitly proposes a joint action. This 
proposal and an accompanying action plan are written so to 
speak on a public bulletin board, allowing responses and 
revisions from others involved. Those who wish to share the 
collective intention may choose to explicitly signal their ac-
ceptance, although the mere simultaneous hearing of the 
proposal might be sufficient if its speaker has enough influ-
ence to direct the group’s action. This latter possibility seems 
to have occurred regularly in my research groups; most 
groups apparently accepted an action plan suggested by a 
verbally dominant member. 
Third, communication provides a forum for participants 
to voice explicit promises to follow the action plan. Tuome-
la’s conception includes the possibility that recognition of 
the acceptance of the proposed plan leading to common 
knowledge of the participants’ joint commitment to it may 
be communicated. Several informal content analyses (Born-
stein, 1992a; Hackett, Schlager, & Walker, 1994; Orbell, van 
de Kragt, and Dawes, 1988) noted a tendency for the op-
portunity to communicate to lead to explicit agreements to 
contribute to a public good. Along with the existence of 
relevant norms, such voiced obligations provide a provi-
sional form of situational trust before members have had the 
opportunity to demonstrate true trustworthiness (Gambetta, 
1988; Hardin, 2002). As noted earlier, these were rare in my 
groups, with acceptance often signaled by questions about 
the proposed action plan and responses repeating and clari-
fying it, and the latter was positively linked with successful 
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ty studies have noted higher cooperative responses for pro-
socials than for proselfs (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990; 
DeCremer, 2000; Liebrand, 1984; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 
1994; Roch & Samuelson, 1997; see the meta-analysis by 
Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009), with some uncovering a 
more specific ordering of altruists (who cooperate no matter 
what), cooperatives (who cooperate if others do), individual-
ists (who cooperate if it brings personal gain), and competi-
tives (who do not cooperate; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; 
Liebrand, 1984; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988).
SVO has been demonstrated to interact with some of the 
cooperative mechanisms described above. Prosocials and, 
to a lesser extent, individualists strive toward equality of 
individual results (Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & DeCremer, 
2006), and awareness of the relevance of norms mediated the 
relationship between concern with collective outcomes and 
cooperativeness (DeCremer & Bakker, 2003). The relation-
ship between SVO and group identity is unclear, with coop-
eratives responding most strongly in a resource dilemma 
study (Kramer & Goldman, 1995) and proselfs in public 
goods research (DeCremer & van Vugt, 1999). Although still 
less so than prosocials, proselfs were noted as more coop-
erative with someone labelled as honest than with someone 
described as either intelligent or unintelligent, which the 
researchers (Van Lange & Semin-Goosens, 1998) equated to 
attributions of trustworthiness. Nicely integrating many of 
these thoughts, Bogaert, Boone and Declerck (2008) pro-
posed a parallel moderated mediation model of the impact 
of social value orientation on cooperation. SVO impacts the 
general willingness of a person to cooperate with others, 
which interacts with situational incentives to cooperate such 
as potential reward for cooperation and degree of group 
identity to determine the person’s preference regarding de-
gree of cooperation. Individualists are particularly influ-
enced by the situation. On a parallel track, SVO impacts 
characteristic expectations of others’ cooperation to be con-
sistent with one’s own.  These expectations then interact with 
the actual level of cooperation others display, resulting in 
situation-specific expectations of reciprocity from others 
and, along with one’s cooperative preference described ear-
lier, degree of cooperation.  On this latter track, it is proso-
cials who are the most affected by context, cooperating with 
other cooperators but not with others. In contrast, although 
SVO differences affect communication content in predictable 
ways (Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, 
& Smith, 2007), with prosocials more likely than proselfs to 
Schroeder et al. (1995) noted that cooperation is greater when 
the payoff for it provides an incentive. In addition, both 
Pavitt, McFeeters, Towey, and Zingerman (2005). and Jans-
sen (2010) discovered that greater incentives result in more 
discussion of strategy and less information exchange. The 
opportunity for the group to punish defectors, i.e., those who 
refuse to cooperate, also stands as an incentive for coopera-
tion (Shinada & Yamagishi, 2008; Yamagishi, 1986). Cul-
tural differences have been noted in comparisons of Japanese 
and American resource harvesting (Wade-Benzoni, Oku-
mura, Brett, Moore, Tenbrunsel & Bazerman, 2001). An 
understanding of the situation in which group members find 
themselves is crucial (Schroeder et al., 1995). There are oth-
ers that I believe are particularly ripe for communication 
research; I will be covering these toward the end of this paper. 
For now, I limit the discussion to two elements with complex 
associations with the generative mechanisms but in which 
communication has received some attention; social value 
orientation and group size.
Social Value Orientation
As described above, March’s (1994) AIR decision-making 
model included “What kind of person am I” as one of the 
questions people ask themselves when making decisions. 
This inclusion implies that individual difference variables 
should impact on how people respond to social dilemmas, 
and both Ostrom (2003) and Schroeder et al. (1995) proposed 
that such variables should impact on cooperative tendencies. 
I have already discussed one of these variables, generalized 
trust; here I describe a second, social value orientation (SVO), 
which refers to people’s typical responses to potentially con-
flictual circumstances. SVO has been conceptualized in 
terms of two orthogonal dimensions, concern with the out-
come for the self and concern with the outcome for the oth-
er party (Joireman, Shelley, Teta, Wilding, & Kuhlman, 
1996; Van Lange, 1999). Three SVO types predominate. 
Those predisposed to favor good outcomes for both self and 
other are known as cooperatives. Those inclined toward good 
outcomes for self and bad outcomes for other are called com-
petitives. Those prone toward good outcomes for self but ig-
nore those for other are referred to as individualists. An 
occasional altruist who wants good outcomes for other and 
is unconcerned about self can be found. Sometimes, altruists 
and cooperatives are grouped as prosocials and competitives 
and individualists are combined as proselfs. More than twen-
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perceived benefit/cost ratio for contributing that would be 
efficacious, and they disagreed with the implication that this 
would necessarily worsen as group size increases. Quite the 
opposite; if start-up costs are equivalent (opening the library 
and building the bridge cost the same no matter the number 
of potential tax payers), then the larger the relevant group, 
the smaller the individual cost for the same benefit, and so 
the probability of contributing would increase. In conclusion, 
the odds of provision changing with group size depends 
primarily on the impact of the latter on the benefit/cost ratio.
In any case, the research results for the impact of group 
size could not offer clearer support for Olson; all else being 
equal, at least twelve published studies have demonstrated 
that members of smaller sized groups take less and are better 
at maintaining resource pools (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1985; 
Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Fox & Guyer, 1977), and contribute 
more and are better at reaching public goods goals (e.g., 
Marwell & Ames, 1979; McCarter, Rockman & Northcroft, 
2010; Yamagishi, 1992) than larger sized groups (see Sally’s, 
1995, meta-analysis for empirical confirmation). Alencar, 
Siqueira, and Yamamoto (2008) provided a real-life example 
of public school children contributing candy bars with anal-
ogous findings. Further, some of Olson’s explanatory frame-
work has empirical evidence behind it. Members of smaller 
groups have greater confidence than larger groups in the 
group’s achievement of a public goods goal (Kerr, 1989). 
These members feel greater personal control (self-efficacy) over 
goal achievement in public goods tasks (Allison & Kerr, 1994; 
Kerr, 1989). Manipulations decreasing either certainty about 
cooperation or self-efficacy increased harvesting in a re-
source dilemma (Au & Ngai, 2003). A viable interpretation 
of these findings is that people are more likely to contribute 
if they trust that their cooperation will not be wasted. An 
implication is that methods for encouraging trust in one 
another’s intention to cooperate will negate the deleterious 
effect of group size, and again there is supportive work. Al-
lison and Messick (1985) noted that a second experience in 
a resource task led to smaller harvests and longer pool main-
tenance for members of six-member groups although not for 
three-member groups. Moreover, Fox and Guyer (1977) ob-
served that a history of cooperation led later cooperation to 
be as great in twelve-member groups as in three-member 
groups. Sato (1988) discovered that cooperation is greater for 
high generalized trusters in three-member groups than either 
high trusters in seven-person groups or low generalized trust-
ers in either-sized groups. This latter discovery provides more 
form a cooperative action plan (Pavitt, Braddock & Mann, 
2009), these differences appear to impact on cooperation 
rates independently of that content (Kerr & Harris, 1996; 
Liebrand, 1984).
Group Size
The most influential theoretical discussion concerning 
the impact of group size is Olson’s (1965) on public goods 
dilemmas. As mentioned earlier, Olson argued that people 
will be willing to contribute to a public good if they are 
confident that their potential personal gain from reaching 
the collective goal outweighs the personal costs for providing 
their share. However, there will always be a degree of uncer-
tainty about the odds of reaching this potential, and the 
greater the uncertainty, the lower the incentive to contribute. 
Uncertainty is a function of the amount of control the indi-
vidual has over whether the goal will be reached, such that 
the greater the control, the lower the uncertainty and so the 
greater the incentive to contribute. Uncertainty is also de-
creased by greater ease in monitoring the actions of other 
group members. The larger the group needed to achieve the 
public good, the less individual control over the outcome, 
the harder the monitoring process, the more uncertain the 
hoped-for result, and so the lower the incentive to contribute. 
In groups that are so large that the effect of each person’s 
decision whether to cooperate is not “noticeable,” the poten-
tial personal benefit of contributing is invisible. In these 
cases, only coercion or personal incentives will provide a 
good enough reason to contribute. Without either of the lat-
ter, the public good will not be attained. In some contrast, 
when groups are small enough so that either (a) at least one 
member has complete control, in other words can individu-
ally provide the public good, is certain of his impact, and 
believes his contribution is personally beneficial despite the 
cost, or (b) each member can see whether one another’s con-
tributions are making a “noticeable” effect on the odds of 
achieving the public good, there is a some possibility of 
achieving it. In short, the larger the group size, the less like-
ly is public good achievement (see Ullmann-Margalit, 1977, 
for a somewhat analogous argument). Olson is not alone in 
this conclusion; Aristotle (1885) provided an early description 
of the deleterious impact of increased group size on coop-
eration, and the variable was included in Ostrom’s (2003) 
model. However, as Marwell and Oliver (1993) pointed out, 
in Olson’s account it is not group size per se but rather the 
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Proposition 3: Increased reward for cooperation favors 
procedural and specific strategy discussion.
Proposition 4: A more prosocial social value orientation 
leads to greater reciprocity and equity norm salience than a 
more proself social value orientation.
Proposition 5: Greater reciprocity and equity norm sa-
lience results in more procedural and specific strategy discus-
sion.
Propositions 4 and 5 together imply that norm salience 
mediates the SVO-to-discussion relationship. It is addition-
ally possible that prosocial SVO independently favors pro-
cedural and specific strategy talk.
Proposition 6: More opportunity to communicate favors 
reciprocity and equity norm salience.
Proposition 7: More opportunity to communicate encour-
ages group identity formation.
Proposition 8: Decreased understanding of the situation 
heightens the amount of pure information exchange and 
general strategy discussion.
Discussion Content
Proposition 9: More pure information exchange and gen-
eral strategy discussion depress the amount and equality of 
resource dilemma harvest and public goods contributions.
Proposition 10: More pure information exchange and 
general strategy discussion take time away from procedural 
and specific strategy discussion.
Propositions 8 and 10 in tandem suggest that the amount 
of information exchange and general strategy talk mediates 
the understanding-to-procedural/specific strategy talk rela-
tionship. It is highly likely that understanding the situation 
has an additional direct and positive impact on procedural 
and specific strategy discussion.
Proposition 11: Greater amounts of procedural and spe-
cific strategy discussion amplifies situational trust.
Proposition 12: Greater amounts of procedural and spe-
cific strategy discussion encourages the activation of reci-
procity and equity norms.
Propositions 5 and 12 simultaneously entail that proce-
dural and specific strategy discussion mediates the linkage 
between the salience and activation of reciprocity and eq-
uity norms. It is almost certain that this latter relationship 
also occurs independently of communication.
Proposition 13: Greater amounts of procedural and spe-
cific strategy discussion results in greater group identity.
evidence that group size effects come down to trust.
Turning to other cooperative mechanisms, Allison et al. 
(1992) uncovered explicit support for the notion that members 
of smaller groups are more likely to follow an equality norm 
in their harvesting from a resource pool than members of 
larger groups. Allison et al. proposed that such norms may 
be broken in larger groups because members believe their 
violation is less likely to be discovered, consistent with Ol-
son’s idea that ability to monitor one another becomes more 
difficult in larger groups. Finally, Balliet’s (2010) meta-anal-
ysis of studies reveals that communication has a greater 
impact on cooperation in larger sized groups than small. 
Consistent with this meta-analysis is Pavitt & Broomell 
(2016) discovery that the opportunity to communicate ex-
tinguished group-size effects for harvesting in a resource 
dilemma and on participant judgments for all of the coop-
erative mechanisms. Further evidence was provided by Me-
leady, Hopthrow, and Crisp (2013)’s finding that members 
of groups imagining communication with one another in-
creased their contributions to a public good as their group 
size increased from 6 to 12 to 24. 
Model and Propositions
Figure 1 diagrams the relationships among the variables 
described in this review. In order to maintain simplicity, 
indirect linkages are minimized and the direction of the 
linkages are not indicated. The latter and some possible ex-
amples of the former are included in the following list of 
theoretical propositions. The figure is organized according 
to a distinction among five types of variables: input before 
discussion, discussion content, output from discussion, pro-
cess of harvesting/contributing, and results of harvesting/
contributing. The propositions are ordered analogously, 
based on the categorization of the causal variable in each. 
Both figure and propositions are strongly influenced by Os-
trom (2003) and Schroeder et al. (1995) along with the re-
search findings described above.
Input Before Discussion
Proposition 1: Larger group sizes decreases situational 
trust.
Proposition 2: Greater generalized trust heightens situ-
ational trust.
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Figure 1. Relationships Among Relevant Variables
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Proposition 14: Greater amounts of procedural and spe-
cific strategy discussion favors the establishment of an 
agreed-on action plan.
Output From Discussion
Proposition 15: A perception of group identity encour-
ages the activation of reciprocity and equity norms.
Proposition 16: The activation of reciprocity and equity 
norms increases situational trust.
 In addition to the indirect impact of group identity 
on situational trust as mediated by norm activation, a direct 
positive relationship likely occurs.
Proposition 17: The presence of an agreed-on action plan 
increases cooperative action.
Proposition 18: The establishment of group identity en-
courages cooperative action.
Proposition 19: Greater situational trust results in more 
cooperative action.
Process of Harvesting/Contributing
Proposition 20: More cooperative action leads to greater 
perceptions of trustworthiness.
Proposition 21: Greater perceptions of trustworthiness 
amplifies situational trust.
Proposition 22: More cooperative action results in more 
positive post-experience perceptions.
Proposition 23: More cooperative action increases the 
amount and equality of resource dilemma harvest and pub-
lic goods contributions.
To summarize the major processes being proposed, the 
sheer experience of being in an interacting aggregate brings 
to mind norms for reciprocity and equity, accompanied by 
the beginnings of group identification. Along with prescrip-
tions for each participant’s own actions, group identity and 
norm activation imply a tentative form of situational trust 
based on the expectations of norm adherence by others. Such 
trust provides warrant for cooperative action even without 
behavioral evidence of other participants’ trustworthiness. 
The content of group discussion generally reinforces group 
identity, norm activation, and situational trust, and is re-
sponsible for the generation of a specific plan of action. The 
result is generally cooperative action consistent with this 
plan, which provides behavioral demonstrations of trustwor-
thiness and confirms situational trust judgments. The prop-
ositions as stated and diagrammed in Figure 1 probably 
underestimate the mutual causality among the cooperative 
mechanisms. For example, in addition to the included rela-
tionships, demonstrations of trustworthiness through coop-
erative action almost certainly reinforce group identity and 
norm adherence. The whole experience results in the estab-
lishment of social capital, nicely defined by Brehm and Rahn 
(1997, p. 999) as “the web of cooperative relationships be-
tween citizens that facilitates resolution of collective action 
problems.” Absence of understanding of the situation directs 
attention to attempts to understand it and vague action plans, 
leading to relatively poor outcomes. Nevertheless, such ab-
sence does not necessarily impact cooperative mechanism 
activation. In contrast, factors such as little situational re-
ward for cooperation, aggregate members low on generalized 
trust and/or with proself social value orientations, and larg-
er group sizes, discourages the establishment of the mutual 
causal influence linkages among the cooperative mecha-
nisms and depresses the chances for cooperative action.
Beyond the Present Model
Scholars have attended to variables beyond those includ-
ed here, some of which (incentives, punishments, culture, 
and situation) I mentioned earlier. Here, I will describe three 
factors that have attracted significant research attention: 
communication channels, formal leadership, and environ-
mental uncertainty. These issues cannot be integrated into 
the present model due to insufficient research attention to 
the role of the cooperative mechanisms. In particular, ad-
ditional research is needed regarding the impact of commu-
nication content. I will finish the section with a short review 
of what is known about content phases during discussion.
A well-established research practice entails conducting 
the process of a social dilemma experience, both group dis-
cussion and subsequent dilemma experience, via computer, 
which eases the application of manipulations during the 
study. A few studies have gone beyond this practice to com-
pare face-to-face discussion with some form of mediated 
interaction, either by computer or by other techniques such 
as telephone and closed-circuit television. In summary, find-
ings thus far appear consistent with expectations that would 
follow from media richness (Daft & Lengel, 1986) and social 
presence (Short, Williams & Christie, 1976) conceptions. 
Specifically, the loss of channels results in a decreased per-
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with some studies reporting greater cooperation (Foddy & 
Crettenden, 1994; Schneider, Foddy, & Bilik, 2004) and oth-
ers less (DeCremer, 2003; DeCremer & van Dijk, 2005). 
Reported relationships of group identity with choice of and 
response to leadership (see Hogg and Reid, 2001, for a theo-
retical analysis), and of leadership style and subsequent group 
member behavior (Bass, 1990; especially Part V), have been 
too complicated to report succinctly here.   
The vast majority of the aforementioned studies opera-
tionalized “leadership” through experimenter manipulations 
of the events individual participants experienced. As such, 
with the exception of when participants were given the role, 
no actual leader existed. In addition, all of these studies 
described the antecedents and consequences of an established 
leader position rather than the leadership-relevant actions 
that group members can take, no matter their role. In a re-
analysis specific to leadership behavior (Pavitt, High, Tressler 
& Winslow, 2007), good game performance was related with 
member contributions involving procedural leadership, giv-
ing information, and summarizing discussion. Analogous 
content analytic work in studies with appointed or elected 
leaders may provide more insight into how those in that role 
can influence their group toward or away from cooperation.
Environmental uncertainty, or uncertainty about some 
aspect of the social dilemma, must be distinguished from 
social uncertainty, or uncertainty about the intentions of 
other group members; the latter is relevant to trust. Group 
members facing resource dilemmas may be uncertain about 
the size of a resource pool or its replenishment rate; those 
tackling public goods dilemmas could be uncertain about 
the size of their personal resource or the provision point (i.e., 
the amount required to obtain the good). In both cases, there 
can be uncertainty about the size of the group. At least ten 
published papers (e.g.; Budescu et al., 1990; Gustafsson, Biel, 
& Garling, 1999; Rapoport et al., 1992) have consistently 
demonstrated that increases in resource pool size uncer-
tainty result in larger and more unequal harvests and higher 
estimates of the pool size and others’ likely harvest. Proposed 
explanations in the resource dilemma context (reviewed in 
Gustafsson et al., 1999) have included a perceptual bias re-
sulting in overestimates of the pool size, a motivation-fueled 
“wishful thinking” effect, and a belief that the equity norm 
is less relevant with more uncertainty. de Kwaadsteniet, van 
Dijk, Wit, & DeCremer (2006) noted these effects as more 
pronounced for proselfs compared to prosocials. Most rele-
vant work has used one-shot dilemmas, but there is also 
ception of involvement with those one is interacting with, 
leading in turn to greater difficulties in reaching satisfactory 
decisions. Cooperation during social dilemmas has been 
consistently greater face-to-face rather than through medi-
ated channels (e.g., Bochet et al., 2006; Brosig et al., 2003; 
Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1998; Samuelson & Watrous-
Rodriguez, 2010). In fact, Brosig et al. uncovered a complete 
social presence effect, with both face-to-face and full medi-
ated conditions more cooperative than audio only, which in 
turn was more cooperative than visual only. At least partly 
accounting for this difference are lower levels of group iden-
tity when discussion is mediated (Samuelson and Watrous-
Rodriguez, 2010; see also Samuelson, Poole, ElShinnawy, 
Vinze, & Baker, n.d). Consistently with the group identity 
decrement is a lower We/I ratio discerned in Rocco’s (1996) 
informal content analysis. Desirable further study would 
explore additional content differences between face-to-face 
and mediated talk. Based on other types of group tasks, past 
work in other contexts (Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1986) im-
plies a more business-like, less social discussion.
Installation of a formal leadership structure has been one 
of the structural solutions to social dilemmas that Olson 
(1965), Hardin (1968), and Ostrom (2003) believed to be 
necessary for cooperation. Resource dilemma research sug-
gests that group members favor the designation of a leader 
when faced with evidence of resource pool overuse, prefer a 
demonstrated low-end harvester as leader when they cannot 
vote for themselves, and lean toward a high-end user in those 
instances in which leadership is desired to combat underuse 
(e.g., Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; 
Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984; van Dijk, Wilke, 
& Wit, 2003). Van Dijk et al. (2003) and DeCremer (2000) 
discovered that failure to achieve a public good also resulted 
in a majority desiring leader assignment. Factors that encour-
age the preference for a leader include democratic or elected 
leaders rather than autocratic or appointed, a group member 
rather than an outsider (Van Vugt & DeCremer, 1999, Study 
1; see also Rutte & Wilke, 1985), member prosocial SVO 
(DeCremer, 2000; Samuelson, 1993), and overuse attributed 
to game difficulty rather than to player greed (Samuelson, 
1991). Leaders are evaluated more positively when they suc-
ceed in maintaining a resource pool (Wit, Wilke, & van Dijk, 
1989), distribute harvests equally among group members 
(Wit & Wilke, 1988), and show interest in group member 
input (DeCremer & van Krippenberg, 2002). Participant 
response to assuming the leadership role has been mixed, 
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well-being. There is reason for cautious optimism given that 
Ostrom’s (2003) model was largely built from case studies of 
such groups. 
And so, the ubiquitous call for further research, including 
studies using methods rarely if ever applied thus far. An 
often-used manipulation in past work entails informing par-
ticipants of precipitous drops in the resource pool, implying 
overharvest and perhaps defection from an agreed-on action 
plan by at least one group member. Pairing this manipulation 
with measurement of member judgments relevant to the 
cooperative principles during different points in the process 
may indicate whether expected drops in trust and trustwor-
thiness ratings are accompanied by additional decreases in 
group identification and/or social norm adherence. Such 
findings would imply the need for bi-directional linkages 
beyond those in the currently-listed propositions and dia-
grammed model. Taking advantage of an idea floated by 
Waldron and Cegala (1992), combining group discussion via 
computer conferencing with simultaneous recording of par-
ticipants verbalizing their concurrent thoughts may provide 
more insights into the relationship among critical factors. A 
second Waldron/Cegala suggestion with the same goal in-
volves participant viewing recordings of their session and 
reporting their memories of their thoughts as the session 
progressed. In a different vein, given the complexity of the 
relationships among the factors known to be significant in 
the social dilemma context, computer simulations would 
allow the implications of countless beginning levels and 
relative strengths of these factors on subsequent processes 
and outcomes; see Stasser (1988) for an exemplar in the con-
text of group social influence.
Beyond research, additional theorizing beyond Ostrom 
(1990) and Schroeder et al. (1995) would be welcome. In 
short, a scientific theory consists of a model and a scientific 
explanation. A scientific explanation includes (a) a funda-
mental motivation for and (b) underlying mechanism govern-
ing people’s responses to and actions, during any 
communication-relevant episode (Pavitt, 2009, 2016). In the 
social dilemma context, SVO likely supplies a fundamental 
motivator behind the decision to cooperate or to defect, but 
SVO is undoubtedly tempered by influences from all of the 
other factors described herein as participants choose their 
actual goal for participation.  Schroeder et al. made a first 
effort at organizing these relationships, but their work needs 
to be integrated both with Ostrom’s and with other insights 
from the scholarly community.
evidence (Hine & Gifford, 1996; Roch & Samuelson, 1997) 
in more true-to-life, repeated-trial dilemmas of greater har-
vesting in response to increased uncertainty in both pool size 
and regeneration rate. Analogously, more uncertainty about 
the provision point in public goods dilemma settings has 
generally resulted in smaller contributions and less confi-
dence that other group members will contribute (Gustafsson, 
Biel, & Garling, 2000; Wit & Wilke, 1998). To the best of my 
knowledge, there has never been a published study allowing 
for communication within groups facing environmental un-
certainty; analogous to the discovery that its presence extin-
guished the usual group size impact on cooperation (Pavitt 
& Broomell, 2016), it is possible that discussion will help 
group members overcome their perceptual biases. 
The presence of phases in interpersonal communication 
has been of interest ever since Bales and Strodtbeck (1951) 
searched for them in group discussion data. Janssen (2010) 
noted early rounds in a resource dilemma dominated by 
discussion concerning game rules and general strategy and 
later rounds by talk about earlier rounds and specific strat-
egy. Janssen, Anderies, and Joshi (2011), in a give-and-take-
some game, observed early rounds to talk about how much 
to contribute and later rounds to how much to harvest. More 
data analyses of this type would be welcome, particularly if 
any located phase structure can be associated with the other 
cooperative mechanisms, cooperation itself, and game per-
formance.
Conclusion
Beyond modeling what we know, one valuable function 
of a paper such as this is to point out what is yet to be learned. 
Along with the just mentioned areas for further inquiry, we 
know little about the relative importance of the input vari-
ables included in the model and the extent to which they 
might interact with one another. These are just two out of 
many relevant questions that need answers: Is the impact of 
group size strong enough to counteract the effect of general-
ized trust on situational trust?  If so, does group size act as 
an independent factor or a moderator of the generalized 
trust-to-situational trust association? We have much to learn 
about the exact relationship among the cooperative mecha-
nisms beyond their mutual causal relationships. I can only 
hope that the model proposed herein has relevance to real-
world groups grappling with social dilemmas critical to their 
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Additional cooperative mechanisms could also be identi-
fied that have not yet been associated with those considered 
herein. One of them would probably be participant percep-
tions of their treatment by the group (procedural justice), which 
includes aspects such as voice (the opportunity to express 
one’s point of view), influence on group decisions, and in-
terpersonal justice (respect and consideration shown by 
other group members), along with treatment by superiors in 
formal organization settings (Organ & Moorman, 1993). I 
close with the hope that others will take on the challenge of 
extending the model proposed here to these and other con-
texts.
Finally, although this effort has been directed toward the 
mixed-motive circumstance, much of it is relevant to other 
situations in which people perform tasks in groups, from 
informal friendship groups to families to training/therapy 
groups to formal organizational teams to mediated structures 
of various types (e.g., chatrooms, multiplayer games). Group 
identity, relevant norms, situational trust, trustworthiness, 
and communication should operate and interact analogous-
ly in these varied contexts as they do in the mixed-motive. 
Some of the input variables, including understanding of the 
situation, generalized trust, and social value orientation, 
should also act independently of context. 
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